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Clientelism and the classification of dominant party systems* 
Aris Trantidis 
 
The view of clientelism as an abuse of state power casts doubt on the democratic credentials of 
highly clientelistic political systems. The question is particularly relevant for the classification of 
dominant party systems that heavily rely on clientelism to elicit popular support and retain a 
relatively open structure of participation. Knowing that clientelism is a widespread practice in 
modern democracies too, how do we evaluate the impact of clientelism on political 
competitiveness in order to sort out the position of these regimes along the lines of democracy and 
authoritarianism? This task requires identifying the conditions under which clientelism becomes 
an essentially authoritarian practice and qualifies these regimes as such. The article puts forward 
two propositions about the circumstances under which clientelism infringes basic democratic 
standards under a thin and a thick definition of democracy. Clientelism under one-party monopoly 
engenders authoritarianism when it thwarts and punishes the contesting voice of citizens by 
effectively blocking exit from its incentives and sanctions.   
 
* This is an earlier draft of the eponymous paper published in Democratization, 2015, 
Volume 22, Issue 1, pp. 113-133. 
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Introduction: Conceptual problems with the classification of dominant party systems 
 
Conceptual ambiguity surrounds the classification of dominant party systems as either democratic 
or authoritarian party systems, 1 and, alternatively, their positioning along the range of semi-
authoritarianism in which regime types are placed somewhere between the poles of democracy and 
typical authoritarianism. A plethora of regime labels such as ‘sultanistic regimes’, ‘demagogical 
democracies’, ‘competitive authoritarianism’, ‘flawed’, ‘managed’ or ‘guided’ democracies tend to 
illustrate specific deficiencies observed in the political systems to which they have been attached.2 
These overlapping regime typologies clearly indicate that the line separating democratic from non-
democratic party systems is ill-defined. Labels such as ‘hegemonic regimes’, 3  ‘electoral 
authoritarianism’ 4  and ‘competitive authoritarianism’ 5  broaden the conceptual reach of 
authoritarianism and include dominant party systems where despite regular and competitive 
multiparty elections ‘the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multi-party 
electoral competition, masks the reality of authoritarian domination’.6 These are settings where the 
prospect of electoral defeat for the dominant party seems to be ‘a very unlikely event in the 
foreseeable future’,7 and other parties are ‘permitted to exist’ but they do not become ‘effective 
political competitors’. 8  Not surprisingly, the extended notion of authoritarianism has been 
criticized for conceptual stretching.9  
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This stretch of the notion of authoritarianism beyond typical autocracies implicitly draws 
on Robert Dahl’s thick and more substantive understanding of democracy as polyarchy, a political 
system with an open structure of participation and low levels of contestation, 10  and his separate 
type of ‘inclusive hegemony’ defined as a regime with no serious flaws in the formal structure of 
participation (unlike typical autocracies) yet characterized by limited inter-party contestability.11 
Here the absence of regular alternation of parties in government becomes the standard by which to 
classify party systems as non-democracies,12 and the conceptual boundaries of authoritarianism 
may go as far as to include all dominant party systems that emerge in a relatively open structure 
for political participation regardless of the means by which a low degree of inter-party 
contestability is achieved. Understandably, regime classification based on the concept of polyarchy 
can be criticized for reflecting a deontological and highly debatable conception of democracy that 
stands in contrast to a thin definition of democracy as an ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s vote’. 13  Policy-making under a ‘procedural’ view of democracy is 
‘determined either directly by the vote of the electorate or indirectly by officials freely elected at 
reasonably frequent intervals and by a process in which each voter who chooses to vote counts 
equally’.14 From that perspective, inter-party contestability may or may not emerge from an open 
structure of political participation whereas a notable degree of political contestability can be 
manifested through intra-party structures of competition and in non-partisan forms of political 
mobilization. In other words, it can be argued that inter-party contestation is not a constitutive 
element of democracy but simply a possible derivative from an open structure of participation.  
 
From a procedural view of democracy, robust classification of regimes along the lines of 
democracy and authoritarianism rests upon the criterion according to which ‘process qualifies 
outcome’ and not the other way around. 15   In other words, the conceptual boundaries of 
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authoritarianism must be drawn by assessing the nature of the process (or processes) that brings 
about a given political outcome. This distinction sets up a clear process for regime classification: 
to assess the democratic credentials of a dominant party system, it is necessary to identify a) which 
instruments and strategies limit inter-party contestability and b) pass a judgment whether they are 
compatible with basic standards of democratic process. If these instruments are found to 
contravene basic properties of democracy, the dominant party system can be classified as 
authoritarian. This is a fine distinction given the intricate conceptual and causal links between 
process and outcome but it is clear enough to guide this task: understandably, not any practice by 
which the incumbent government manages to limit its exposure to contestation amounts to an 
authoritarian restriction that would consequently qualify the regime as authoritarian, and dominant 
parties gain or lose democratic credentials along the democracy-authoritarianism continuum 
depending on the severity of the typical authoritarian restrictions they use. At first glance, a 
dominant party system cannot be classified as authoritarian as long as the electoral process is kept 
open to all citizens and their political organizations, and insofar as there is no serious and 
systematic application of fraud, intimidation or violence to force changes in the citizens’ political 
behaviour against their free will. In that case, low degrees of inter-party contestability observed in 
a dominant party system can be interpreted as the genuine expression of electoral choice. Political 
competition takes place principally within the dominant party’s internal structure and through 
other non-partisan forms of political organization. One may go as far as to suggest that political 
demands, expectations and grievances in those dominant party settings are adequately represented 
and advocated in central politics through the ranks of a single dominant party. On the contrary, 
dominant party systems are authoritarian when dominant parties are found to make use of extra-
democratic means posing systematic limitations to the structure of political participation.16 
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Consequently, the classification of dominant party systems is problematic when they are 
found to employ a wider menu of manipulation to skew open multiparty elections in favour of the 
ruling party. 17  This menu may primarily include the application of softer forms of electoral 
manipulation such as a range of distributive politics including clientelism and pork-barrel politics 
next to typical authoritarian controls that consist of the application of violence, intimidation, 
electoral fraud and systematic exclusions from political participation through reserved seats and 
biased electoral rules, and restrictions to voter and party registration, the freedom of the press and 
free campaigning. In actual empirical settings, clientelism has been contained in greater and more 
complex political structures with a varied ‘continuum of repressive and participatory variations.’18 
Clientelism has been recorded as a key strategy for dominant parties in numerous empirical 
setting: Japan, Mexico, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Taiwan, Russia and other Former Soviet Republics, 
to name a few notable cases. 19  In many cases, clientelist relations were often found to be 
‘reinforced’ by the threat of direct forms of coercion.20 
 
Nevertheless, it may be found that in many empirical settings the use of typical 
authoritarian controls has been patchy, sporadic or mostly responsive to crisis events or, in any 
case, not regular enough to sustain the dominant party in power, had it not been for a sufficient 
degree of actual popular support manifested in elections. The dominant party may impose 
authoritarian restrictions but these are unsystematic, and the party - unlike typical authoritarian 
regimes - is still dependent on popular support.21  The party is then heavily reliant on softer 
manipulative practices. Clientelism becomes a key, if not the primary, strategy by which the party 
could increase its popularity and fend off contestation by the opposition.22  Classification of highly 
clientelist dominant party systems is more problematic in those cases since the infrastructure for 
political repression is insufficient to secure incumbency in the event of falling popularity due to a 
relatively open electoral process. In that case the classification of the dominant party system 
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largely depends on assessing the democratic credentials of clientelism, which is, nonetheless, 
observed in modern democracies too.   
 
The critical question is how to gauge the regime’s degree of authoritarianism. The crucial 
variable here is the extensive practice of clientelism defined by ‘particularistic and contingency-
based exchanges’, creating vast relationships of ‘contingency, hierarchy, and iteration.’ 23  If 
assessment is restricted to the range and severity of coercion and direct controls on political 
participation and expression, we may then place outside the sphere of authoritarianism those 
dominant party system that have not systematically used outright and direct restrictions to civil 
rights to a degree that blocks political participation but they have made extensive and systematic 
use of clientelism. However, we need a normative evaluation of clientelism given its distorting 
effect on political behaviour. To a large extent, this is where the conceptual ambiguity surrounding 
the regime status of dominant party systems lies: this is an empirical setting of limited inter-party 
contestability in a relatively open participation structure, there is extensive use of clientelism and 
at times a recorded scale of typical authoritarian controls that is, however, too erratic or 
unsystematic to account (exclusively or primarily) for the longevity of the incumbent’s power 
monopoly. These empirical settings are understandably the greyest area in regime classification. 
The article suggests that regime classification should a) evaluate the contribution of soft 
manipulative practices such as clientelism to one-party dominance together with measuring the 
relative severity of typical authoritarian practices, and b) assess the democratic credentials of these 
practices as they have been applied in a particular socioeconomic and institutional context.  
 
Given this recommended research direction, the purpose of the article is to clarify the 
conditions under which clientelism becomes an essentially authoritarian practice, and dominant 
party systems heavily reliant on that practice can be classified as authoritarian in accordance with 
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the robust criterion that ‘process qualifies outcome’. In the article’s view, this criterion does not 
exclude prima facie the extension of the notion of authoritarian controls beyond the typical list to 
include non-violent manipulative tactics such as clientelism; yet, any conceptual extension has to 
be justified against a clear-cut definition of what an authoritarian practice is.  
 
This task is highly problematic given the nature of clientelism as a ‘contextually 
embedded phenomenon’ that extends across a variety of regimes and may, or may not, overlap 
with democracy depending on the levels of competition and participation in the political system.24 
First, the socioeconomic and political context in which clientelism unfolds may significantly shape 
its effect on citizens’ behaviour. Second, ambiguity exists due to the various manifestations of 
clientelism as a political phenomenon that range from a form of particularistic politics in tune with 
the competitive nature of democratic process to a practice seriously distorting the terms of political 
competition to the extent that overall political behaviour could deviate substantially ‘from that 
prescribed by (or expected from) the formal rules’,25 at times helping the government party shield 
a power monopoly. When a dominant party system emerges out of this context, its position along 
the lines of democracy and authoritarianism largely depends on whether the terms under which 
clientelism takes place contravene basic democratic standards. Third, assessing the democratic 
credentials of various forms and types of clientelism may also stumble upon the persisting 
controversy over the very notion of democracy stemming from the presence of a thin and a thick 
definition. We are still in search of a clear line beyond which the practice of clientelism can be 
regarded as infringing basic elements of the democratic process. So far, prevailing current 
accounts of clientelism presented in more detail in the next section hold the view that clientelism is 
compatible with democratic process; actually a by-product of the highly antagonistic terms of 
political competition. Alternative arguments tend to emphasize clientelism as an abuse of state 
power which, when applied on a large scale, could limit political competition, but these arguments 
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sketch out a rather controversial notion of ‘authoritarian clientelism’ based on Dahl’s notion of 
inclusive hegemony and resort to his axiomatic position according to which limited inter-party 
contestability is a feature of a non-democracy.  
 
 These conceptual challenges require two interrelated theoretical undertakings: First, when 
seeking a standard for evaluating the democratic credentials of clientelism, we must give full credit 
to Dahl’s definition of democracy and place it in the context of his broader work as a statement on 
democratic process too and not solely a typology based on regime characteristics. Important points 
of interface between contestability and procedural definitions regarding the basic requirements of 
democratic process are the capacity of citizens to contest political decisions and outcomes, and 
their freedom to determine their preferred course of political behaviour. Second, we must develop 
a convincing argument that clientelism or a particular type of clientelism contradicts these basic 
requirements. For that purpose, the prevalent current take on clientelism helps us keep a healthy 
distance from idealist projections of how citizenship and participation should be preferably 
exercised. 26  Instead, to consider clientelism as a practice whose extensive and systematic 
application renders a regime authoritarian we need an argument indicating that clientelism, or a 
type of clientelism, works in ways similar to typical authoritarian controls in restricting political 
participation and the contestability of political outcomes by the affected parties. Finally, this task 
must pay attention to the socioeconomic and political context in which clientelism is applied.  
 
Is clientelism compatible with democracy?  
 
The prevalent view in the literature sees clientelism as a common political pathology of modern 
and it stands quite far from declaring the practice as ipso facto authoritarian. 27    Clientelist 
relationships are one of the many forms in which diverse social interests are represented and 
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promoted, serving as a practical (although for some undesirable) solution to the problem of 
democratic representation. 28  Clientelism emerges from two interrelated political processes: 
competition for office and competition for access to resources distributed by political power. On a 
micro-level, clientelist exchange involves an essentially consensual agreement for an exchange of 
benefits between the patron, a person of higher socioeconomic status, and the client, a person of 
lower status.29 As Stokes put it succinctly, ‘the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is 
simply: did you (will you) support me?’30Although this form of exchange clearly departs from the 
ideal-types of ‘principal-agent’ and ‘trustor-trustee’ relationships in political representation, it is 
still compatible with the pragmatic terms under which democratic politics take place. 
Consequently, highly clientelistic dominant party systems can be considered as democratic 
regimes insofar as they offer voters and political actors an open structure for political participation. 
A line of reasoning can be derived that could go as follows: a) clientelism is one of the main tools 
employed by dominant parties to limit inter-party contestability, b) clientelism is a practice 
compatible with a democratic political system, and, consequently, c) a highly clientelistic 
dominant party system must be classified  either as a democracy or a flawed democracy if the 
dominant party makes limited use of authoritarian controls but not to a degree sufficient to 
determine the electoral outcome, let alone shut down completely the formal structure of 
participation.  
 
Nevertheless, the question of compatibility between clientelism and democracy is 
complicated by the effect widespread one-party clientelism could have on inter-party competition. 
Focusing on the distorting effect of government resources and non-violent manipulative uses of 
state power on competition, Greene, Levitsky and Way provide arguments why the extensive 
application of clientelism can be placed among the practices that render a dominant party system 
authoritarian.31  Greene uses Przeworksi’s idea of ‘meaningful elections’ to draw a distinction 
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between competitive authoritarian parties and predominant parties that emerge in conditions of 
‘more regular democratic turnover’.32 He broadens the list of practices that make an election not 
‘meaningful’ by including subtle manipulative tactics other than coercion which, nonetheless, 
significantly raise the organizational costs for the opposition to become an effective political 
contestant.33 Clientelism is one of the key practices affecting the participation decisions of social 
actors by changing the pay-offs they derive from alternative choices of political participation. As a 
result, extensive application of clientelism by the dominant party makes it more difficult for the 
opposition to recruit supporters and activists by raising its organizational costs to such an extent 
that competition with the incumbent is no longer meaningful. This gives the dominant party a 
degree of influence unmatched by any alternative political organization. Dominant party systems 
of that type bear a resemblance to Diamond’s electoral hegemonies in the sense that the victory of 
the opposition party becomes an improbable event requiring a level of ‘opposition mobilization, 
unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in a 
democracy’.34 
 
In a similar vein, the extensive practice of clientelism can be placed along other formal or 
informal restrictions to the opposition’s access to resources, media, and the law. Their combined 
application in a given political arena could lead to the emergence of a ‘competitive authoritarian’ 
regime according to Levitsky and Way.35 More broadly, the politicization of state power and state 
bureaucracies skews the political playing field in favour of the incumbent. While this phenomenon 
is observed in democracies too, it is the scale of this abuse that substantiates the claim that one-
party dominance associated with these softer tactics of political manipulation is essentially 
authoritarian. Like Robert Dahl, Levitsky and Way elevate the notion of a ‘reasonably level 
playing field’ into a constitutive part of the definition of democracy. Yet the co-authors go one 
step further and place emphasis on the process by which this outcome is achieved.  By asserting 
11 
 
11 
 
that a large scale of electoral manipulation via state power is unacceptable in a democracy, 
Levitsky and Way’s solution to the conceptualization problem associates the political outcome (in 
essence, Dahl’s limited contestability) with the systematic bias in favour of the incumbent that is 
produced by the use of state resources. Outcome is thereby linked to process. Even lawful 
exercises of state power can give the incumbent a source of advantage in electoral mobilization 
which instils unfairness in the terms of political competition.   
 
The thin definition of democracy inspired by Dahl’s polyarchy could now serve as a 
yardstick to assess not directly the nature of the dominant party system as an institutional outcome 
but, instead, the democratic credentials of clientelism as a process leading to that outcome. 
Clientelism is affecting the level and the quality of political participation.36 It could be argued that 
clientelism when reducing political contestability essentially becomes an authoritarian tool. The 
problem with this line of argument, however, lies in the fact that, when it comes to the application 
of soft manipulative practices, the conceptual boundaries between authoritarianism and democracy 
remain unspecified. A large scale of clientelism applied by political patrons to manipulate voting 
choices and political behaviour is observed in both authoritarian regimes and highly competitive 
political systems commonly regarded as democracies. A highly clientelistic competitive party 
system still exhibits distortions similar to those observed in a dominant party system, this time 
involving two or more clientelist parties that come to share a dominant position thanks to the 
advantages in political mobilization they derive through patronage. The scale of clientelism 
practised in many contemporary democratic systems secures both incumbents and all other parties 
that engage in clientelism strong electoral advantages versus outsiders.37 The playing field is again 
heavily skewed but this advantage is now shared by the clientelist political forces. Non-clientelist 
parties, on the other side, for instance minor parties, new entries and individual candidates that 
cannot engage in the supply of clientelism, face high informal barriers to entry. This creates a clear 
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deficiency in the structure of representation, as substantive opportunities for multi-party 
contestability stemming from ideological and political differences, long-standing social cleavages 
and other emerging policy divisions are missed.   
 
A possible response to this objection would point to the fact that, while the terms of 
political competition have been skewed in favour of the clientelist parties, many of today’s highly 
clientelistic political systems have retained a degree of political competitiveness thanks to the 
existence of more than one clientelist parties. Thanks to the multi-party setting of political 
competition associated with decentralized distribution of clientelist supply there are competing and 
relatively autonomous political forces, and meaningful competition has survived. These highly 
clientelistic systems pass both Levitsky’s and Way’s criterion of what constitutes a fair level 
playing field and Greene’s requirement for meaningful elections.. However, here is where the 
caveat to Greene’s and Levitsky and Way’s arguments returns. By focusing on the aggregate effect 
of clientelism on inter-party contestability this position resorts to the axiomatic position that the 
desired outcome (inter-party contestability) determines the type of regime, and only comes to 
delegitimize the regime when clientelism is found to reduce the degree of political competitiveness 
in favour of a single party.  
 
We may be now close to understanding what is wrong with clientelism when applied on a 
large scale but we have not yet come up with a convincing argument why and when clientelism 
runs counter to core properties of democratic process, which must be the benchmark against which 
the democratic credentials of a regime must be assessed. The line may be narrowly defined by a 
rather uncontroversial interpretation of authoritarianism as the coerced imposition of political 
outcomes on citizens through violence and other outright restrictions and exclusions from 
participation. Alternatively, it can espouse Dahl’s deontological view of inter-party contestability, 
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this time as a criterion for assessing the legitimacy of the political means and tactics employed by 
the incumbent to limit its exposure to political competition – not as a benchmark to assess the 
regime output itself. From that perspective, Dahl’s’ notion of contestability can be read as a strong 
statement on the importance of associational activity in preventing one-group domination through 
mutual ‘détente’ among various social and political groups.38 What safeguards democracy is a 
delicate balance of power in which no group has enough resources to impose outcomes on all 
others. This system of mutual controls is secured when the cost of domination by one group is 
raised by the associational activity of others.39  In brief, Dahl’s thesis on democracy adds to the 
notion of democratic process the requirement of ‘guaranteed freedoms of association and 
expression’.40   
 
This interpretation enables a synthesis between a thin, procedural definition of democracy 
and Dahl’s more substantive thesis on contestability, this time with reference to the assessment of 
the processes, ‘the methods’, by which a political group keeps itself in power. The synthesis 
adopts a view of democratic process as an open competitive process in which citizens with equal 
rights and associational autonomy could contest political outcomes and decisions that affect their 
own circumstances and freely develop political activities to promote their interests and claims. 
This view understands democratic politics as competition for access to state power and 
acknowledges that state power can be the object of trade between politicians and citizens with their 
organizations through clientelism, a practice widespread in a large number of modern political 
systems. An authoritarian method is distinguished from a democratically compatible practice in 
the way it restricts citizens’ capacity to contest the exercise of political power on them. The 
classification criterion shifts away from inter-party contestability as a regime trait and focuses on 
processes that bring about involuntary changes in citizen’s behaviour under certain conditions.   
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In that regard, a type of clientelism is authoritarian when it seriously damages citizens’ 
capacity to contest political outcomes that affect them and forces changes in their political 
behaviour against their will. This type seems to be standing far away from the view of clientelism 
as a perverse yet legitimate form of voluntary exchange engaging free citizens, ‘the clients’, which 
is, however, compatible with democracy’s pluralistic politics. If the nature of clientelism is to be 
assessed on account of its impact on citizens’ capacities and freedoms, the task requires examining 
the multiple ways in which clientelism intersects the notion of democratic process defined as an 
open structure for citizens to participate, express their views and develop political activity. This 
evaluation calls for a broader observation of the multiple socioeconomic settings in which clients 
are situated, as well as of the implications regarding the contestability of clientelism beyond the 
dyadic relationship between patron and client. The second task requires assessing the full impact 
of clientelism on the availability and quality of substantive opportunities for citizens to contest 
political decisions that affect them.  
 
Clientelism as an illegitimate form of particularistic politics 
 
At first glance, clientelism appears to be a form of particularistic politics in tune with the clients’ 
capacity for political participation and associational autonomy. Prospective clients and politicians 
enter an agreement by which they seek to maximize their utility, the latter achieving immediate 
and tangible returns possibly more significant than outcomes expected through other forms of 
political activity at collective level. Although the effect of clientelism on the quality of the political 
process could be viewed with a high degree of skepticism as an obstacle to the development of 
horizontal civil society organizations,41 a great loss to the processes of collective deliberation, 
mandate-making, and retrospective evaluations of governments, 42  a restriction to the general 
benefits a society can gain from political representation,43 a corruption of the ideal relationship 
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between citizens and politicians,44 and a hindrance to the attainment of broader political agendas,45 
clientelism conforms to a realistic view of democratic process. Citizens are not required to 
articulate claims that appeal to broader categories of interest,46 and they can legitimately channel 
their political activity to promote special interests even to the detriment of others. Political power 
involves selection among conflicting demands articulated by self-interested actors. Democratic 
process bestows citizens with some bargaining resources to influence selection processes. Civil 
rights and liberties allow citizens to complain, protest, organize collective action to influence 
political decisions and openly dispute political outcomes. Their political activities aim at shifting 
the distribution of politically-allocated resources in their favour.  
 
Clientelism becomes a realistic way for political and social actors to settle the allocation 
and distribution of goods and services. From a perspective stripped of idealistic views of 
democracy, it stems from the nature of politics as primarily particularistic by the very processes it 
unleashes. Clientelist exchange may demand their resignation from other forms of associational 
activities in return, but such resignation is voluntary. Just as government policies may be 
motivated by partisan gain rather than a genuine interest in general welfare, voters are free to use 
their rights for whatever payoff they think it is in their interest, even for the purpose of a cynical 
exchange of votes driven by humble motives in search of individualistic gains.47 In other words, 
citizens’ autonomy extends to the freedom of clients to make effective use of their formal political 
rights as resources to bargain for politically distributed goods and services.  This pragmatic 
approach of democracy indicates the gap that separates ‘what is theoretically desirable and what is 
practically possible’.48 To expect universalism in politics is unrealistic, unattainable and possibly 
not desirable.49 From that perspective, we may consider clientelist exchange as corrupt practices, 
but this does not provide a convincing conceptual basis upon which to support the incompatibility 
thesis. The opposite view stressing the corrosive effects of clientelism on citizenship is a 
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normative statement that inevitably reflects subjective and often controversial standards of how 
citizenship should be exercised.50 
 
Nevertheless, the prevalent take on clientelism can be criticized for overlooking a crucial 
aspect of the phenomenon: the contestability of the negative externalities of clientelist exchanges 
by third parties affected by discrimination and favouritism. If the essence of democratic process is 
to offer citizens substantive opportunities for contesting political decisions, formal channels should 
be available for the settlement of competing claims and grievances by those disaffected by 
particularistic allocations. The democratic process is not expected to eliminate negative 
externalities emerging from selection via the political process and cannot prevent any perceived 
misallocations and injustices of political particularism. Yet ‘going public’ may mitigate the 
problem of the negative effects from political decisions and may increase the possibility that 
political selection will not systematically exclude a set of preferences and interests. Advocates of 
democratic process may hold the optimistic expectation that, in responding to competing demands 
that are articulated through formally open processes of debate and deliberation, the government 
will tend to deliver public policies that approximate prevalent perceptions of ‘common interest’. 
Others may simply expect that an openly debated selection process tends to put in place some 
societal checks on the discretion enjoyed by government power. From that perspective, a selection 
process in the allocation of goods and services by political power is democratically legitimate 
insofar as it is performed through the formal channels that allow political representation and 
advocacy exactly because this allows citizens disaffected by particularistic allocations to contest 
decisions and outcomes in a relatively open and transparent way. Again, associational autonomy 
and the capacity to contest political outcomes including particularistic allocations distinguish 
legitimate from illegitimate forms of particularistic politics.   
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If particularistic politics conform to basic properties of the democratic process, insofar as 
there are substantive opportunities enabling all citizens to check the selection process and 
challenge in public debate particularistic allocations that have a negative impact on them, pork-
barrel politics defined as the selective allocation by politicians of a public resource to a given 
constituency or group in anticipation of public support may well conform to this standard. The 
requirement of publicity and exposure to debate is likely to be met by virtue of the open, 
formalistic and often legislative process by which these allocations are typically agreed upon and 
the size of the allocations involved. While pork-barrel politics – like clientelism – is a form of 
favouritism deliberately employed as a political mobilization strategy,51 as long as the scale and 
process of pork-barrel politics make these allocations visible and thus exposed to public debate, 
the practice meets the above-mentioned standard of democratic process despite the negative costs a 
pork-barrel allocation may produce on general welfare. The same criterion would assess the 
contestability of negative externalities emerging from clientelist exchange: are there any 
substantive opportunities available to citizens to detect, expose and challenge the negative impact 
they experience from clientelist allocations? 
 
The targeted and often individualistic nature of clientelist favours tends to differ from 
other forms of redistributive politics in terms of visibility and the degree of public interest each 
specific case is likely to raise. First, while the practice of clientelism is an ‘open secret’ - at times 
creating strong reputations for patrons that attract new clients and preserve old ones, clientelist 
agreements are typically reached ‘behind closed doors’, meaning that other actors with a direct 
interest at stake cannot easily identify and bring the issue to open debate, particularly at the time 
when negotiations take place between the patron and the client. Clientelist exchanges are 
deliberately designed to avoid transparency and bypass public scrutiny so that other affected 
parties are deprived of the opportunity to be aware of them prior to the agreement or challenge 
18 
 
18 
 
them through formal institutional channels afterwards. Second, even when a given clientelist 
agreement becomes visible, the granting of selective benefits may directly affect a few isolated 
actors. Inevitably, the capacity of third parties to contest these allocations largely relies on the 
availability of advocacy by existing political organizations, most often the parties and politicians 
of the opposition. These political agents would most probably decide to engage resources to track 
a specific case when it is likely to elicit a substantive degree of public interest. Importantly 
enough, public interest in a specific case of favouritism depends on the magnitude of the clientelist 
favour and the number of the people affected by it. It is thus quite likely that political opponents 
may decide not to devote scarce political resources to track and challenge specific cases of 
discrimination and favouritism and, instead, limit themselves to generic criticism of the prevalence 
of clientelism as a political phenomenon. Visibility and contestability of specific clientelist 
allocations may be further reduced under the circumstances of a dominant party system where 
political resources in the hands of minor political parties are in shorter supply. Eventually, specific 
cases of favouritism, each affecting a limited number of social actors, will generally go 
uncontested. On the contrary, both the opacity of individual clientelist transactions and the 
prevalence of clientelism as a general phenomenon could further reduce the contestability of its 
clientelist allocations by strengthening the party’s mobilization power on the political actors who 
could have tracked these cases.  
 
Clientelism as authoritarian control of political behaviour 
 
The second task is to explore the conditions under which clientelism could be equated with typical 
authoritarian controls in the way it restricts the freedom of citizens to make effective use of their 
formal political rights, forcing citizens to adjust their political behaviour against their will by 
threatening harm. Clientelism, or at least a particular form of clientelism, infringes democratic 
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process if it is found to work in that way. The line separating authoritarian and non-authoritarian 
ways to manipulate behaviour is defined here by the distinction between coerced versus voluntary 
behavioural change. 
 
At first glance, clientelism seems to differ considerably from the way typical authoritarian 
practices force changes in political behaviour. State power is employed in both cases, but the 
exercise of physical violence and intimidation, by threatening personal freedom, physical integrity 
and possibly life, deprives individuals of the basic freedom to choose a preferred course of action. 
Clientelist incentives and disincentives do not entail the obvious restrictions that coercion places 
on choice which force adaptations in behaviour against one’s will. Quite the opposite, clientelist 
incentives trigger voluntary adaptive responses by self-interested actors. The relationship between 
patrons and clients seems to reflect a consensual agreement by which they both anticipate 
significant gains. One may go as far as to suggest that the availability of clientelism in a 
democracy broadens the citizens’ options in their attempt to gain access to resources by adding a 
new range of returns to the value of their vote and political activity. Even though clientelist 
exchange is a highly hierarchical relationship by which clients enter a sphere of authority, insofar 
as clientelist incentives do not force citizens to change unwillingly their behaviour, and 
prospective clients have the freedom to accept or deny the rewards offered, clientelism 
manipulates behaviour in a non-coercive way and the impact of clientelism on political behaviour 
cannot be equated with typical authoritarian controls over political behaviour.  
 
This notion of clientelism as a voluntary transaction may be challenged by those pointing 
to the involvement of state power– by its very nature authoritative and coercive – in clientelist 
exchange. The power asymmetry in clientelist exchange is further sharpened by the imbalance 
between demand and supply – on the one side myriads of prospective clients aspiring to enter into 
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a clientelist exchange and, on the other, the much smaller number of patrons with the political 
power to meet these demands. Competition on the demand side means that only a small number of 
powerful clients will be able to negotiate the terms of the agreement. This disparity exacerbates the 
gap in bargaining power between patrons and clients, allowing the patrons to raise the ‘price’ 
charged, i.e. the reciprocation required in return of the granted favour, and undermining 
accountability from their part.52 Clientelist exchange under power asymmetry resembles the type 
of contract in which one party leaves no choice to the consumer other than ‘take it or leave it’. A 
first response to this objection, however, could point out that asymmetrical power relations exist in 
all forms of particularistic politics. Just as any political relationship, clientelism involves 
asymmetrical power in the process of selection and exclusion for the distribution of resources,53  
and this asymmetry alone cannot equate clientelism with typical authoritarian practices that 
directly restrict citizen’s autonomy and associational capacity. Yet, as the degree of asymmetrical 
power varies, we may again ask the question whether asymmetrical power relations under 
clientelism may go as far as to create a structure of political dominance and citizens’ 
subordination.  
 
This question emerges when the negative side of clientelism comes under scrutiny; when 
citizens who do not fulfil their duties and commitments as clients face discrimination in the 
allocation of goods and services provided by means of patronage supply.54 The efficacy of a 
clientelist strategy in demanding behavioural changes is associated not simply with the capacity of 
patrons to reward clients but also with their capacity to punish dissenters and defectors by 
exclusion, discrimination and material retaliation. Retaliatory measures may include, for instance, 
dismissals, unfavourable job placements, refusal to grant a license, serious delay in the delivery of 
government services, refusal to provide credit from state-controlled banks, discriminatory tax 
controls etc. Equally punishing can be the exclusion from a wide array of discretionary favours 
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that are only available to co-opted social and economic actors. In both cases, exclusion and 
discrimination are sanctions imposed by patrons to punish political defiance, defection or mere 
political apathy as behavioural choices. These clientelist disincentives oblige actors embedded in a 
clientelist political context to make a risk assessment whose parameters vary on the basis of one’s 
socioeconomic position and degree of risk aversion, and shall involve: 
 
 Assessing the severity of the cost one may suffer, given one’s social and economic status 
(impact assessment) 
 Evaluating the probability that a particular course of behaviour bring about a penalty. Risk 
assessment will look at the rate of occurrence of penalties attached to the behaviour under 
consideration, which is traced in the frequency of relevant incidents by the government 
acts (signaling probability). 
 Evaluating the possibility of mitigation or compensation by looking at whether there are 
opportunities for exit to spheres of private economic activity relatively autonomous from 
clientelist practices. 
 
A substantially large number of reported or rumoured cases of economic retaliation indicate high 
probability that the same sanction will be imposed on anyone who considers following a similar 
path of behaviour in the future. The severity of punishments serves as a warning signal to 
prospective and existing clients about the high cost of dissent or defection. The effectiveness of the 
sanction is strengthened when there are limited opportunities to avoid or offset the losses from the 
sanction imposed. This depends on the opportunities available to economic and social actors to 
develop activity in spheres that remain relatively autonomous from clientelist incentives. This is 
also contingent on the availability of other antagonistic networks for clientelist exchange that 
could offer dissenting citizens protection, patronage and compensation for current losses and 
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sanctions. The larger the range of activities subject to clientelist incentives and disincentives, and 
the more limited the presence of  clientelist networks, the lower the chances one has to avoid the 
range of clientelist disincentives imposed by the incumbent. 
 
Ultimately, the scope for exit from clientelist disincentives imposed by the incumbent 
defines one’s degree of freedom to choose freely a desired path of political behaviour. When 
exclusion and discrimination cannot be avoided, the cost may be high enough to force individuals 
to alter their political conduct to avoid imminent sanction. The opportunity cost of the sanctioned 
course of behaviour is raised to levels comparable to the costs imposed on dissenting political 
behaviour by means of coercion in authoritarian regimes. When clientelist discrimination and 
exclusion reach a degree and intensity that essentially deprives individuals of free choice, 
clientelism works in similar ways as coercive power and ceases to be compatible with democratic 
process. This is authoritarian clientelism that punishes ‘voice’ by depriving exit, 55  triggering 
involuntary adjustments in one’s political behaviour.  
 
Conditions of limited exit from clientelist sanctions are observable in party systems that 
exhibit two structural characteristics: a) the dominant party has a monopoly or near monopoly over 
the supply of clientelism and there are no sizeable antagonistic clientelist networks to compensate 
citizens for current losses and sanctions, and  b) the economy is ‘highly politisized’ in the sense 
that a significantly large share of resources is being administered and accessed via clientelist 
exchange and there is no substantial room for citizens to develop social and economic activities 
outside the reach of clientelist incentives. In that context, there are blockages to ‘exit’ and material 
punishments sanctioning ‘voice’, from which individuals cannot opt out without suffering serious 
and inescapable damage to their welfare. The extensive application of clientelism in a dominant 
party system with a highly politicized economy becomes essentially coercive, a direct restriction to 
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political freedom in a way similar than coercion. The aggregate pattern of behaviour adaptive to 
clientelist incentives under these conditions can be seen as the result of forced integration into a 
structure of subordination, and classifies the dominant party system as authoritarian.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
When sorting out the position of highly clientelistic dominant party systems that retain a relatively 
open structure of participation along the lines of democracy and authoritarianism, classification 
largely relies on assessing the nature of clientelism under practice. This task awaits a fuller 
analysis of clientelism as a subset of particularistic politics that would explore which 
manifestations of this practice are not compatible with basic elements of democratic process. It is 
also complicated by seemingly distinct approaches derived from a thin and a thick definition of 
democracy that give a different verdict on the effect of clientelism on inter-party contestability.  
 
The article has proposed a synthesis toward a notion of democratic process that 
incorporates contestability into the standard by which to assess clientelism. Democratic process is 
defined here primarily as the availability to citizens of real and substantive opportunities to 
periodically exercise control over political elites as well as the autonomy and capacity to contest 
political decisions that affect them. The task shifts away from measuring the impact of clientelism 
on inter-party contestability – which may be affected by manipulative practices compatible with 
democracy – to assess its impact on citizen’s capacity and autonomy in the socioeconomic and 
political context in which citizens are situated. 
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The article first assesses the nature of clientelism against the basic democratic requirement 
that political decisions involving allocation and selection should be exposed to open debate and 
deliberation. Although clientelist exchange results from agreement between the patron and the 
client, the negative externalities it generates must be contestable by the disaffected third parties. 
The article indicates the conditions under which clientelism prevents third parties from challenging 
discrimination and favouritism and, therefore, becomes an illegitimate form of particularistic 
politics. The degree to which this deficiency is serious enough to compare with typical 
authoritarian controls depends on the range of the resources available for contestation, which are 
again highly contingent on the scale of clientelism under practice and the availability of political 
resources. These resources are particularly scarce under the circumstances of a dominant party 
system.  
 
The second argument focuses on the opportunity cost for the citizens to follow their 
preferred course of political behaviour in defiance of clientelist incentives and disincentives. 
Clientelism is essentially authoritarian when it is found to affect citizens’ behavioural choices in 
similar ways to typical coercion. This happens when the opportunity cost is raised to a degree that 
prospective clients have no real choice to accept or deny the rewards offered and are essentially 
deprived of the freedom to opt out of clientelist exchange and avoid informal sanctions. This can 
be observed in the way exclusion and material retaliation under a dominant party system could 
force involuntary changes in political behaviour in the context of a highly politicized economy, as 
social actors lack exit to spheres of economic activity relatively protected from government 
discrimination.  
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